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INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND PHYSICIANS' 
RIGHTS AFTER VACCO V. QUILL 
Larry I. Palmerf 
Calling something a "right" is an institutional 
statement. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Disagreement about the nature of constitutional rights in our legal 
system is prevalent. For those who view the Constitution as a set of 
principles for protecting individual rights, physician-assisted suicide 
raises the question of whether our rights may be transferable. Or, must 
we exempt physicians from the criminal prohibitions against aiding sui-
cide in order to realize our sense of autonomy in dying? In other words, 
·can a patient's personal "right of privacy" protect a physician from crim-
inal prosecution for assisting the patient's suicide? 
In Washington v. Glucksberg2 and Vacco v. Quill,3 the Supreme 
Court answered this question in its constitutional form with a "no" by 
affirming that criminal prosecutions of physicians for assisting patients' 
deaths remain theoretically possible. In Quill, the Court rejected an 
"equal protection" challenge to New York's assisting or aiding suicide 
laws.4 Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the Court, reasoned that it is "ra-
tional" for legislatures to provide immunity from prosecution for those 
physicians who remove life-sustaining technologies of terminally ill pa-
tients in accordance with state law, while at the same time subjecting 
physicians to criminal liability if they accede to patient requests for lethal 
doses of barbiturates.5 In Glucksberg, the unanimous Court used five 
different reasons to find no "liberty" violation in Washington's statutory 
provisions against causing or aiding suicide. 6 In so doing, the Court in-
t © Copyright, Larry I. Palmer, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. Harvard 
University, LL.B., Yale University. I acknowledge the assistance of Roberta Armstrong and 
Suzy Szasz, who were kind enough to read drafts of. this essay. Adam J. Cohen, Class of 1998, 
Cornell Law School, provided valuable assistance with the footnotes. 
1 NEn. K. KoMESAR,!MPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTioNs IN LAW, Eco-
NOMICS, AND PUBuc PouCY 43 (1994). 
2 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). 
3 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997). 
4 Id. at 2296. 
s See id. at 2302. 
6 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2272 (state's interest in life of its citizens); id. at 2272-73 
(state's interest in treating the causes of suicide); id. at 2273 (state's interest in the integrity of 
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dicated that the debate about the appropriate role of physicians in our 
dying should continue in other policy forums, particularly in state legis-
latures, regulatory agencies,7 professional organizations, commissions,8 
and religious groups. 
Were we to follow the lead of constitutional theorists such as 
Professors Laurence Tribe9 and Ronald Dworkin, 10 the various analyses 
of "liberty" in Glucksberg would frame the debate in state legislatures 
the medical profession); id. at 2273-74 (state's interest in protecting vulnerable groups); id. at 
2274-75 (state's interest in preventing the "slippery slope" to euthanasia). Justice O'Connor 
agreed with the "vulnerable groups" and "slippery slope" bases. See id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). Justice Stevens agreed with the "preserving life" basis, see id. at 2305, and the 
"vulnerable groups" basis while mentioning the majority's reliance on the "medical integrity" 
basis. See id. at 2308-09 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Souter agreed with the "slippery 
slope" basis. See id. at 2290-91 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Breyer did not mention any of 
Rehnquist's interests, but considered the lack of infringement of a right to palliative care dis-
positive. See id.- at 2312; see also supra text accompanying notes 49-51. 
7 The federal Drug Enforcement Administration recently announced that prescribing 
medication to assist a patient's death under Oregon's Death with Dignity Act would be in 
violation of its interpretation of the federal narcotics law which requires a "legitimate medical 
purpose" for every prescription. See Steven Findlay, DEA Challenges Oregon Doctors; Nar-
cotics Law to be used Against Assisted Suicide, USA TODAY, Nov. 11, 1997, at 6A. 
8 At the state level, the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law has been 
influential in shaping that state's law regarding the ethical issues associated with medicine. 
The New York Task Force report, When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in 
the Medical Context (1994), not only recommended no change in New York statutes regarding 
assisted suicide, but was relied upon by the United States Supreme Court in upholding the 
constitutionality of those statutes. See Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2301. At the nationalleve1 over the 
past twenty-five years, we have grown accustomed to legal bodies or officials asking blue-
ribbon panels to make recommendations about public and legal responses to ethical dilemmas 
in science and medicine. Public outcry in 1972, for instance, over the revelations of a forty-
year study of untreated syphilis among rural African-American males in Tuskegee was the 
precipitating event for Congress establishing the National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Since that time, several prominent 
commissions at both the federal and state levels have made recommendations on policy and 
legal matters. The most recent example of what Professor David Rothman has labeled "Com-
missioning Ethics" in his book, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAW AND 
BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 168-89 (1991), is President Clinton's 
appointment of a National Bioethics Advisory Commission, chaired by the President of 
Princeton University, Harold T. Shapiro, a distinguished economist. 
9 Advocates for the position that physicians' rights are matters for constitutional adjudi-
cation have focused on a final footnote in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion and language in 
some of the concurring opinions in Glucksberg to suggest that the Court may hold in a future 
case, with a different kind of plaintiff, that there is some type of constitutional right to die. As 
Professor Laurence Tribe, Dr. Quill's lawyer before the Supreme Court, said after Glucksberg 
and Quill: "the Court, far from slamming the door, in fact, if you look at it carefully, left it 
open by a vote of nine to nothing." NPR Morning Edition: Supreme Court Rulings (NPR 
broadcast, June 27, 1997) (statement by Laurence Tribe). 
10 Professor Dworkin, along with five other "leading philosophers," filed a brief on be-
half of the physician-respondents in both cases. See Brief for Ronald Dworkin et al., as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 95-
1858), and Vacca v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 96-110). Dworkin details his views on 
the issue of assisted death in his book LIFE's DoMINioN: AN ARGUMENT ABoUT ABORTION, 
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993). For a critique of his framing of the constitu-
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and administrative bodies.l 1 Such an approach assumes that legislatures 
and courts should examine the question of physicians' rights in the same 
manner-that courts and legislatures are essentially the same kind of in-
stitution-at least when it comes to addressing major social values such 
as how we die. This approach encourages legislators and voters to ex-
amine the Court's rhetoric about the nature of "rights" in framing and 
resolving legislative issues. 
Legislatures, however, differ from courts. Both are legal institu-
tions, but they have different procedures and constraints. More signifi-
cantly, legislators and their staffs are obligated to listen to all of the 
contentious views, even those that differ from their own views and prin-
ciples about how law should structure our relationships with our physi-
cians. Courts, on the other hand, are obligated to decide only those cases 
that litigants bring before them. As a result of these contrasts, in consti-
tutional adjudication, courts must determine which institution should re-
solve an issue. 
I reject Glucksberg as a guide for building the analysis for the ensu-
ing legislative debate. Rather, Quill provides the institutional framework 
for delineating the issues we face in legislative forums and other institu-
tional settings. 
The institutional analysis embedded in Quill is easy to miss for one 
simple reason: the Second Circuit decided its case a few months before 
the Supreme Court issued a major opinion on equal protection, Romer v. 
Evans.12 In Evans, the Court held that a Colorado constitution~ amend-
ment violated the United States Constitution.13 The amendment disabled 
local municipalities from enacting any legislation prohibiting discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation.14 The Court struck down the 
amendment without finding any "fundamental right" or declaring that 
homosexuals are members of a "suspect class."15 Once we understand 
Evans as a signal that the Court was going to deterinine the claims of a 
tional issues, see Larry I. Palmer, Life, Death, and Public Policy, 81 CoRNELL L. REv. 161 
(1995) (book review). 
11 Other "rights" theorists such as Professor Lois Shepherd are not necessarily unsympa-
thetic to the Court's result, but nonetheless focus on G/ucksberg and its implications. See Lois 
Shepherd, Dignity and Autonomy after Washington v. Glucksberg: An Essay about Abortion, 
Death, and Crime, 7 CoRNELL J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y (forthcoming 1998). 
12 116 S. Ct 1620 (1996). 
13 ld. at 1623. 
14 See id. 
15 The majority opinion in Evans, written by Justice Kennedy, is somewhat remarkable 
in how it avoids any discussion of the Court's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986), which upheld the constitutionality of state statutes maldng sodomy a crime. Kennedy 
avoided Bowers by framing the question in terms of whether the Colorado amendment was 
rationally related to a "legitimate governmental purpose." Evans, 116 S. Ct at 1629. Such a 
statement of the issue allowed the majority of the Court to define the outer boundaries of the 
legislative process. By invalidating the Colorado amendment, the majority's equal protection 
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"constitutional right to die" by viewing the matter as one of institutional 
choice, Quill becomes the starting point for interpreting the scope of leg-
islative authority to exempt physicians from legal liability for assisting 
their patients' deaths. 16 
A particular Justice's views on abortion, choice in dying, or family 
formation are informed by how that Justice makes the choice between 
courts, legislative processes, or "the market" as the appropriate forum for 
public policy making. Each of the five Justices writing opinions17 in 
Glucksberg and Quill posed different questions about institutional 
processes. All of the Justices concluded, however, that the legislature is 
the legal forum for defining which patient actions are self-killing or sui-
cide. In denying the physicians' claim for a constitutional right, the 
Court also granted to political processes the job of determining which 
physician acts constitute legally impermissible assistance in patient 
deaths. 
Part I illustrates that the problem of physician-assisted suicide re-
quires an analysis of two basic social institutions: law and medicine. The 
different institutional perspectives of the Justices led to variation in their 
Quill opinions. We discover these different theories of comparative in-
stitutional analysis by letting the questions each Justice asks frame the 
analysis. All of these different theories are subsumed by the overall 
question in law and medicine inherent in Quill: when is terminating med-
ical care suicide? Part II demonstrates that interpretations of federal drug 
laws and Medicare and Medicaid regulations have a role to play in the 
physician-assisted suicide debate. Finally, Part III suggests that the phy-
analysis provided constitutional protection from "irrational legislation" by providing all indi-
viduals with a core right to participate in interest group politics. 
In contrast, Justice Scalia's dissent used Bowers to frame the constitutional issue when he 
stated the overall issue to be whether a majority can preserve "traditional mores" against a 
politically powerful minority. See id. at 1631-32, 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's equal 
protection analysis requires that the plaintiffs be entitled to some "fundamental right" before 
the Court can invalidate legislation. 
The implications of Evans for the debate on physician-assisted suicide are apparent if one 
uses the approach of either the Evans majority or dissent to frame the issue. If one asks 
whether there is a fundamental right in the physician-assisted suicide cases to commit suicide, 
the Evans dissenters would answer with a resounding "no." If, using the Evans majority's 
analysis, one asks if physicians or patients in the assisted suicide cases are denied their right to 
"rational legislation," the answer is also likely to be "no," for a number of complex reasons 
discussed later in this article. The basic point is that the first step in any institutional analysis 
of problems in law and medicine is the kind of questions one asks. 
16 After Oregon enacted its Death with Dignity Act permitting a form of physician-as-
sisted death, some individuals challenged the constitutionality of the statute on the grounds 
that it violated the requirement of "equal protection." The attempt failed. See Lee v. Oregon, 
107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir.), cen. denied sub nom. Lee v. Harcleroad, 118 S. Ct. 328 (1997). 
17 Justice Ginsberg wrote a short concurring opinion joining Justice O'Connor's opinion, 
but did not provide any reasoning. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2310. Justice Ginsberg's 
views are excluded from the analysis which follows. 
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sician-assisted suicide scheme authorized by Oregon voters is not a 
model for legislatures in other states because voter initiatives and legisla-
tive enactments represent different kinds of institutional processes. 
I. IS TERMINATING MEDICAL CARE SUICIDE? 
The Supreme Court's unanimous vote rejecting the constitutional 
claims in Vacco v. Quill illustrates how the judges of the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals misconstrued the constitutional issues. The premise 
underlying the Second Circuit's finding of an equal protection violation 
in the New York statutory scheme was based on an assumption about the . 
allocation of institutional responsibility. Judge Miner, for the Second 
Circuit majority, interpreted prior Supreme Court cases as implying that 
federal constitutional courts rather than the New York legislature, had 
the institutional power to declare that the removal of medical care was 
the equivalent of suicide.18 The Supreme Court not only rejected that 
premise, but used the brief from the American Medical Association and 
other professional organizations to reject the proposed institutional bal-
ance between courts, medicine, and legislatures articulated in Judge Cal-
abresi's Second Circuit concurring opinion.I9 
A. Is THE DEFINITION ·oF SUICIDE A PoLmCAL DECISION? 
In finding the New York statutory scheme "rational" under equal 
protection analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied upon Evans as stating 
the appropriate standard for examining the physicians' claims.20 When 
Rehnquist asserted in Quill that the Equal Protection Clause "creates no 
substantive rights,"21 he meant more than simply that the various legisla-
tive provisions in question are presumed constitutional. He meant the 
18 Judge Miner assumed that once he had concluded that the plaintiffs had presented ·a 
case for judicial resolution, the appropriate Equal Protection Clause analysis allowed him to 
conclude that the New York legislature had established "two classes" of persons. Later in the 
opinion, he declared that the New York statute allowing the removal of life sustaining treat-
ment under New York's Health Care Proxy Law was the equivalent of suicide even though the 
statute provided for civil and criminal immunity for physicians operating under it. See Quill v. 
Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997). Although Judge Miner 
might not have been able to "guess" how the Supreme Court would frame the questions of 
rights in Evans a few months later, his opinion is nonetheless an example of how judges fail to 
view questions in medicine as requiring careful analysis of whether courts or legislatures 
should determine the degree of social control needed for modem medicine. 
19 Judge Calabresi's concurring opinion concluded that the New York statute that pro-
hibited assisted suicide was at least close to being unconstitutional and thus required a remand 
to the state legislature for reconsideration of whether the ban on physician-assisted suicide was 
still appropriate. See id. at 742-43. His theory that judges could ''update" statutes which no 
longer enjoy popular support is outlined in his previous scholarship and is cited throughout his 
opinion. See GUIDo CALABRESI, A CoMMoN LAw FOR THE AGE oF STATUTES (1982). 
20 See Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2297. 
21 Id. 
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physician-litigants have to demonstrate that the legislation puts physi-
cians, not patients, in an institutionally untenable position. 
To reject the argument that physicians could rely upon the rights of 
their patients, Justice Rehnquist had to reject Quill's rhetorically power-
ful brief and its premises about modern medicine.22 Professor Tribe, 
Quill's lawyer, had constructed his brief around the suffering and plight 
of by-then-dead patients. Tribe relied upon the declarations of patients 
who were dying of cancer and complications associated with AJDS23 to 
support his assertion that a patient "in the final stages of dying is not 
committing suicide when choosing to avoid only unbearable, conscious-
ness-filling pain or suffering."24 Only these patients, Tribe asserted, 
have a constitutional right. 25 In essence, Professor Tribe invited the 
Court to construct the cases around hypothetical patients instead of his 
client, Dr. Quill, and his colleagues. 
In denying Dr. Quill's claim, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion re-
lied heavily upon the brief filed by the American Medical Association 
and forty-five other professional organizations.26 According to the 
AMA, physicians generally distinguish between terminating life-sus-
taining treatment and intending to cause a patient's death. 27 Thus, legis-
lation which prohibits physicians from assisting patients' deaths properly 
classifies situations in which physicians "intend" their patients' deaths. 
Legislation granting physicians immunity from criminal prosecution 
when they remove life support properly categorizes such deaths as "unin-
tentional." Furthermore, removal of life support demonstrates the insti-
tutionalization of the ethical principle of "respect for patient autonomy" 
in modern medicine. More significantly, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied 
upon language in the AMA Brief to assert that "the law has long used 
intent or purpose to distinguish between two acts with the same result."28 
The fundamental point of the AMA Brief was that the distinction made 
in New York law would help ensure that the medical field would begin 
to address its inadequacies regarding pain relief. 
22 See Brief of Respondents, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858). 
23 See id. at 5-8. 
24 /d. at 3. It is worth noting that Professor Tribe assumes that courts have an obligation 
to relieve the suffering of those patients. See Lois Shepherd, Sophie's Choices: Medical and 
Legal Responses to Suffering, 72 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 103 (1996) (discussing the philosophi-
cal and legal reasons underlying this assumption and its effects on the legal and medical 
realms). 
25 See Brief of Respondents at 19-20, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-
1858). 
26 See Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2298, 2298 n.6. 
27 See Brief of the American Medical Association et al., at 19-20, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. 
Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858) [hereinafter "AMA Brief']. 
28 Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2299 (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403-06 (1980); 
Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)). The latter case was cited and played a 
central role in the AMA Brief. See AMA Brief, supra note 27, at 20. 
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Finally, the AMA Brief helped Chief Justice Rehnquist dismiss Pro-
fessor Tribe's suggestion that the Court could determine that "terminal 
sedation"-the practice of providing pain medication for some terminal 
patients until they are unconscious-made the prohibition of a lethal dos-
age upon request constitutionally irrational.29 The AMA's description of 
pain management in modern medicine allowed Chief Justice Rehnquist 
to put this practice into a conceptual framework of consent by the pa-
tient, the intent of the physician, and the ethical principle of "double 
effect."30 
Holding that legislative distinctions were rational in general, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged differences of opinion in the medical 
community regarding physician-assisted death31 and the possibility of 
some situations where there might be a constitutional defect in a legisla-
tive scheme.32 For Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, defining "suicide" 
is a political decision and not a task for constitutional adjudication. 
Once it had been established in Glucksberg that the then-dead plain-
tiffs had no constitutional right to physician-assisted death, the primary 
question for Chief Justice Rehnquist in Vacco v. Quill was whether the 
New York legislature had somehow infringed upon the constitutional 
rights of physicians. For Rehnquist, holding criminal prohibitions 
against assisted suicide-even when applicable to physicians-to be a 
constitutional exercise of state legislative authority, effectuates the ap-
propriate institutional balance between legislatures, courts, and the medi-
cal community. Underlying Chief Justice Rehnquist's construction of 
the issues in Quill, therefore, is an institutional choice of legislatures, 
rather than courts, to define suicide. 
B. WHEN ARE JUDGES AND JURIES ALLOWED TO lNv ALIDATE 
PHYSICIANS' CONVICTIONS FOR ASSISTED SUICIDE? 
Justice Stevens's concurring opinion, in which he discussed the con-
stitutional issues in both Quill and Glucksberg, presented a different view 
of the appropriate institutional balance between the medical community, 
legislatures, and courts. Stevens relied upon the briefs of Professor Tribe 
and others, urging the Court to find a constitutional right to physician-
assisted suicide in framing the issues with regard to medicine. 33 Ulti-
mately, however, Justice Stevens rejected the constitutional analysis of 
29 See Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2301 n.11. 
30 See id. at 2298-2301; Timothy E. Quill et al., The Rule of Double Effect-A Critique 
of Its Role in End-of-Life Decision Making, 337 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 1768, 1768 (1997) ("Ac-
cording to the ethical principle known as the 'rule of double effect,' effects that would be 
morally wrong if caused intentionally are permissible if foreseen but unintended."). 
31 See Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2298 n.6. 
32 See id. at 2302 n.l3. 
33 See id. at 2308-10 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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these physician-assisted suicide proponents. By suggesting that constitu-
tional questions might arise when the states seek to impose criminal 
sanctions for the practice of physician-assisted suicide, Justice Stevens, 
in effect, chose the judiciary as the appropriate forum to resolve the phy-
sician-assisted suicide issue. 34 
Stevens considered the constitutional issue involved in physician-
assisted suicide to be similar to the constitutional issues associated with 
the imposition of the death penalty.35 The Court has become the ultimate 
arbiter of whether imposition of the death penalty is appropriate since 
legislatures cannot constitutionally require it for all crimes or even all 
homicides.36 Thus, in both Glucksberg and Quill, the issue for Stevens 
was whether the particular plaintiffs before the Court had, in fact, 
demonstrated the unconstitutionality of the statutes. According to Ste-
vens, none of the patient-plaintiffs or physician-plaintiffs were 
"threatened with prosecution for assisting in the suicide of a particular 
patient."37 
In addressing what is essentially the "due process" issue and the 
most relevant precedent, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health, 38 Justice Stevens asserted that the state's interest in preserving 
life is limited by "the individual's interest in choosing a final chapter that 
accords with her life story, rather than one that demeans her values and 
poisons memories of her."39 
In Quill, Justice Stevens criticized the basic premise about "intent" 
in the AMA's Brief.40 He used the practice of "terminal sedation," as 
described by Tribe, to suggest that Chief Justice Rehnquist and the 
AMA's assertion that legislatures can make distinctions on the basis of 
physicians' intent is "illusory."41 Thus, Justice Stevens wants the Court 
to be open to future constitutional challenges on physician-assisted sui-
cide,42 while Chief Justice Rehnquist wants the debate transferred to 
state legislatures. 
34 See id. at 2304-05. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. at 2304 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffit v. Florida, 428 
U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)); see also Larry I. Palmer, The Positions 
of Justices Stewart and White on the Death Penalty: A Study of Two Perspectives on Discre-
tion, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 194 (1979). 
37 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2304 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
38 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of the refusal of a state court to 
order the removal of a persistently vegetative patient's life support). 
39 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2308 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
40 See id. at 2310. 
41 !d. 
42 "[O]ur holding today in Vacco v. Quill that the Equal Protection Clause is not violated 
by New York's classification ... does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of 
the New York statute may impose an intolerable intrusion upon the patient's freedom." Id. 
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C. ARE LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS NoT TO BAN CERTAIN MEDICAL 
PRACTICES ARBITRARY EXERCISES OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY? 
Justice Souter's short concurring opinion in Quill adopted Justice 
Stevens's view that the state "permits" what he calls "death-hastening 
pain medication."43 In his attempt to synthesize the Court's complex due 
process and equal protection cases through a "principled" methodology 
for determining the constitutionality of statutes,44 Justice Souter assumed 
that the question was whether courts or legislatures should "permit" ter-
minal sedation. He argued that it is appropriate for legislatures to "per-
Init" the practice,45 but failed to consider the empirical reality that the 
practice was, in fact, authorized by the medical community, and not the 
courts or legislatures. 
Souter's common law method of adjudication46 assumed that "ter-
Ininal coma" is what Professor Tribe described, as opposed to the end 
result of a carefully thought through process of medical intervention. As 
the patient is gradually given increased doses of pain medication, the 
patient's tolerance for the medication grows. In other words, an ethical 
physician does not commence pain medication with the intent of creating 
a "terminal coma." Rather, physicians determine the amount of sedation 
a terminally ill patient should receive after careful consideration of the 
particular patient's condition and consultation with the patient and his or 
her fainily.47 
The significance of Justice Souter's framing of the question is that 
legislatures can make distinctions between various proposed medical 
practices without violating the Constitution. Yet, implicit in Souter's 
Glucksberg opinion is the proposition that the Court holds the ultimate 
authority to determine if a certain legislative distinction is an arbitrary 
infringement on liberty. Thus, this somewhat complex methodology in-
vites continued constitutional adjudication. 
D. DoES MEDICINE CAUSE DEATHS WITHOUT DIGNITY? 
Justice Breyer was more explicit about the nature of the constitu-
tional adjudication that Inight follow Glucksberg and Quill. He explic-
43 117 S. Ct at 2302 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
44 ·See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct at 2275-93 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
45 See id. at 2293. 
46 Justice Souter's method of reasoning bears a close resemblance to the scholarship of 
the "legal process" tradition. See e.g., Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Consti-
tutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973). 
47 When students in my spring, 1997 seminar on physician-assisted suicide questioned a 
colleague from our medical college about terminal coma, many of them assumed the question 
was: "Doctor, how much pain medication does it take to kill a patient?" The physician 
pointed out that the amount of pain medication a patient can withstand depends upon the 
previous amount of pain medication she had been receiving. 
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itly asserted that there may be some type of constitutional "right to die 
with dignity."48 Breyer relied upon the briefs of the AMA, the National 
Hospice Care Organization, and Choice in Dying to frame the issue as 
one of medicine's failures: 
Medical technology, we are repeatedly told, makes the 
administration of pain-relieving drugs sufficient, except 
for a very few individuals for whom the ineffectiveness 
of pain control medicines can mean, not pain, but the 
need for sedation which can end in a coma.49 
According to Justice Breyer, neither state statutes nor judicial rulings 
prevented patients from obtaining pain relief.50 As he stated in his opin-
ion, many terminally ill patients do not receive adequate pain medication 
"for institutional reasons or inadequacies or obstacles, which would seem 
possible to overcome, and which do not include a prohibitive set of 
laws."51 
In his opinion, Justice Breyer attempted to put a "gloss" on Justice 
O'Connor's concurring opinion which explicitly joined with Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's opinion.52 Justice Breyer began his concurrence with 
the statement, "I believe that Justice O'Connor's views, which I share, 
have greater legal significance than the Court's opinion suggests."53 By 
joining Justice O'Connor's opinion, but refusing to join the opinion of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Breyer implied that Justice O'Connor has a 
sharper difference with the Chief Justice than she stated in her own 
concurrence. 54 
E. Do TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS HAvE A CoNSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO pAIN RELIEF? 
The portion of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion dealing with 
Quill makes an important assertion: "There is no dispute that dying pa-
tients in ... New York can obtain palliative care, even when doing so 
48 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
49 /d. at 2311-12. 
so See id. at 2311. Some scholars have argued that the statutory framework governing 
professional discipline for misuse of pain medication needs to be modified. See e.g., Sandra 
H. Johnson, Disciplinary Actions and Pain Relief: Analysis of the Pain Relief Act, 24 J.L. 
Mso. & ETHICS 319 (1996). But none of the litigants in the cases before the Court made out a 
plausible claim of a realistic fear of prosecution or professional discipline for administering 
pain medication. The Court did, however, take up the issue of pain relief. See infra text 
accompanying notes 55-56. 
51 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
52 See id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
53 /d. at 2310. 
54 See Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide but a Constitu-
tional Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEw ENG. J. Mso. 1234, 1235 (1997). 
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would hasten their deaths."55 She made it clear that the case does not 
raise the question of whether those terminally ill patients who are "suf-
fering" can obtain pain relief. O'Connor struck a different institutional 
balance from Chief Justice Rehnquist. By framing the question in terms 
of relieving patient suffering, Justice O'Connor narrowed the scope of 
any future constitutional claims. She shut the door on a claim about sui-
cide, but clearly wanted to provide litigants with greater access to courts 
on issues of suffering during their terminal illnesses than Chief Justice 
Rehnquist; s analysis would permit. 
Justice O'Connor's desire to permit future constitutional adjudica-
tion on issues of pain relief indicates that she has less confidence than 
does Justice Rehnquist in the ability of legislatures to control medicine. 
Review of O'Connor's earlier opinions supports this conclusion. First, 
her short concurring opinion in Cruzan made clear that she wanted to 
leave open the question of whether the legislature could prohibit a surro-
gate from removing medical treatment on behalf of a comatose patient. 56 
Although no state had an explicit prohibition against surrogate removal, 
O'Connor seemed aware of the potential for other institutional forces, 
such as religion or medicine, to influence legislation regarding the re-
moval of life support. 57 
More important, Justice O'Connor indicated in Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey,58 the most recent abortion case, that she wants the Court to be 
able to adapt to changing societal concepts of liberty without granting 
broad definitions of constitutional rights. 59 Lest anyone assume that she 
was inviting constitutional litigation, O'Connor asserted-rightly in my 
opinion-that there are no legal barriers to the administration of pain 
relief medication.60 Or, put more pragmatically, when O'Connor com-
mitted the issue of physician-assisted death to the "laboratories" of the 
states,61 she provided a context for both legislatures and potential liti-
gants. For the latter, she made it clear that "facial," as opposed to "as 
applied," attacks on regulatory schemes regarding the dispensing of 
drugs would receive a cool reception.62 Moreover, it is apparent that the 
plaintiff's identity would make a great deal of difference in the outcome 
of any future constitutional adjudication. Thus, a physician subject to 
professional discipline for administering pain medication to a terminally 
55 ld. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
56 497 U.S. 261, 289-92 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
57 See id. at 290-92; see also Palmer, supra note 10, at 169-71 (discussing Justice 
O'Connor's views on terminating medical care and abortion). 
58 505 u.s. 833 (1992). 
59 Id. at 847-52. 
60 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
61 See id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)). 
62 See id. 
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ill patient might be able to raise the liberty claim of her patient to obtain 
adequate pain relief. 
II. THE FEDERAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
SUBSEQUENT DEBATES 
All nine justices agreed with Justice O'Connor's rhetoric about the 
constitutional right to palliative care. 63 As a practical matter, this implies 
that any legislation prohibiting assisted suicide should have a specific 
provision exempting physicians who are administering palliative care. 64 
Consequently, the state legislative debate begins by eliminating the pol-
icy option of tightening up regulations of pain medication. 
None of the major players opposed to physician-assisted suicide in 
the constitutional and political forums, such as the AMA and the Catho-
lic Church, have any interest in more restrictive regulation of pain medi-
cation. On the contrary, the AMA appears on record as being 
committed to improving patient access to palliative care. 65 In this re-
spect, Justice Breyer also spoke for the majority of the Court when he 
indicated that restrictive laws, as opposed to institutional failures in 
medicine, would lead to a different result in any subsequent constitu-
tional litigation over such matters.66 
Despite Chief Justice Rehnquist's assertion that legislatures have 
wide latitude to define suicide, legislative drafters who wish to provide 
physicians with legal immunity67 for some assisted deaths face a new 
issue-criminal prosecution under federal narcotics laws. The federal 
Drug Enforcement Agency recently announced that the use of drugs for 
63 Professor Robert A. Burt provides essentially the same analysis of the overall effect of 
the various opinions in the assisted suicide cases. See Burt, supra note 54, at 1234-36. On the 
other hand, Professor David Orentlicher suggests that those same opinions have sanctioned the 
practice of euthanasia by embracing "terminal sedation." See David Orentlicher, The Supreme 
Court and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Rejecting Assisted Suicide but Embracing Euthanasia, 
337 NEw ENG. J. MEo. 1236, 1236 (1997). One need not resolve the conflict between these 
two medical ethicists/lawyers if one remembers that the important public policy choice made 
by the Court was to determine that legislatures rather than courts are the least detrimental 
institution for resolving the assisted suicide debate and related issues. 
64 Several state statutes that prohibit assisting or aiding suicide have explicit provisions 
exempting pain medication by physicians. See e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.12 (West 
1997); S.D. CoDIFIED LAws§ 22-16-37.1 (Michie 1997). Of course, Jack Kevorkian has been 
able to use a similar clause in the now defunct Michigan law to argue successfully before 
juries that his use of carbon monoxide was meant to relieve the patient's pain rather than kill 
the patient. From an institutional perspective, we should distinguish what jurors are allowed to 
do by constitutional design from the different constitutional constraints legislatures might 
have. 
65 See AMA Brief, supra note 27, at 22. 
66 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
67 As a practical matter, this means, for instance, that legislatures can regulate medical 
practice and provide legislative immunity for physicians who follow the statutory scheme. 
This has already been done with living wills and health care proxy legislation, which usually 
provide explicit immunity provisions. 
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assisted suicide under Oregon's Death with Dignity Act constitutes a 
non-medical use under federallaw.68 The DEA's position could lead to 
another round of litigation if a pharmacist or physician were prosecuted 
under federal narcotics laws. 69 Although litigants might frame the issue 
as whether the federal drug law's definition of medical purpose "pre-
empts" Oregon's definition of medical purpose, such a prosecution could 
test the parameters of the constitutional right to palliative care.7° 
Under Rehnquist's constitutional analysis, a state legislature has the 
institutional competence to define suicide, and thus, to determine 
whether a medical practice at the end of life is legitimate. On thy other 
hand, Congress has asserted that federal funds should not be used to sup-
port the practice of physician-assisted suicide.71 
The actual implementation of any assisted suicide statute in the 
states faces two possible obstacles. First, whether the federal govern-
ment's interest in controlling the distribution of drugs-requiring every 
physician and pharmacist in this country who administers narcotics to 
have a certificate from the federal government-can override any partic-
ular state's political decision to have physician-assisted death. Second, 
whether the one state where voters, not the legislature, have authorized 
the practice of physician-assisted death can devise a scheme to pay for 
the death-hastening drugs without the use of federal Medicaid or Medi-
care funds. 
Given that it was the first state to attempt to "ration" its Medicaid 
expenditures, Oregon· may have enough voter interest in the cost pres-
sures of health care to tackle this problem. Embedded in these questions 
is the larger institutional issue of Congress's role in medicine. 72 
Proponents of assisted suicide in the vast majority of states, how-
ever, have an uphill battle. The Court's decision was, in some sense, 
68 See William Claiborne, Oregon Doctors may Face U.S. Fight on Assisted Suicide; 
Despite Referendum Upholding Law, DEA Warns that Licenses to Write Prescriptions are at 
Risk, WASH. PosT, Nov. 13, 1997, at A4. 
69 See 21 C.F.R. §1306.04(a) ("A prescription for a controlled substance to be effective 
must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose ... and the person knowingly filling [any such 
prescription] ... shall be subject to ... penalties."); United States v. Larson, 682 F.2d 480, 
482 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 991(1982); United States v. Limberopoulos, 26 F.3d 
245, 249-51 (1st Cir. 1994) (affirming convictions of pharmacists for filling "illegitimate" 
prescriptions). · 
70 Given the debate about the "new textualism" in statutory interpretation, it is possible 
that the Court could decide this question as one of statutory interpretation rather than one of 
constitutional law. When the Court is dealing with Congress, it is often a different institutional 
problem than when dealing with state political decisions. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey, Foreword, Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 27, 43-44 (1994). 
71 See Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14401-14408 (1997). 
72 Note for instance, Congress's use of the Medicare and Medicaid funding to impose 
standards about giving notice about declining treatment, see 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (1996), and 
the standards for inpatient discharges. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395d (1996). 
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made with full knowledge of the views of the various interest groups that 
are likely to participate in any political debates of physicians' roles in our 
deaths.73 The Court's "no rights" finding, therefore, has probably 
swayed the moral debate against mobilizing the kind of political forces 
necessary to overcome the inertia of doing nothing. In addition, propo-
nents face a national coalition, as indicated by the recent federal adminis-
trative rulings and federal statutes, that will oppose the open legalization 
of physician-assisted death. 
III. WHEN THE VOTERS SAY "YES" TO 
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 
Now that voters in Oregon have again approved a bill authorizing a 
form of physician-assisted death,74 Oregon may become the first legal 
"laboratory" for determining whether the hopes of its proponents or the 
fears of its opponents will become reality. Proponents might look at the 
60 percent majority75 favoring the retention of the recently-passed initia-
tive in Oregon as evidence that many other states will follow the "Ore-
gon Trail." Opponents have already announced their intention to file a 
lawsuit to block implementation of the 1994 Oregon Death with Dignity 
Act.76 If, however, we take seriously Chief Justice Rehnquist's invita-
tion in Glucksberg to have a true debate about the role of physicians in 
our dying,77 we must be cautious about relying upon the Oregon experi-
ence as representative of the entire country. 
First and foremost, even though the Oregon voters said "yes" to 
physician-assisted death in 1994, voters in other western states have re-
cently said "no." In 1991, the voters of Washington rejected a measure 
that would have "de-criminalized" several forms of physician assistance 
73 Bear in mind that over seventy briefs were filed in the recent Supreme Court litigation. 
Whether a systematic analysis of all these briefs would indicate this was a case of "mi-
noritarian bias" is not of immediate concern. What may be more significant is the fact that 
when the Court finds itself with limited capacity to solve a problem such as physician-assisted 
suicide, legislatures may find themselves incapable of resolving the issue. See Einer Elhauge, 
Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31,66-87 
(1991) ("[T]he same interest groups that have an organizational advantage in collecting re-
sources to influence legislators and agencies generally also have an organizational advantage 
in collecting resources to influence the courts."). In this debate, Compassion in Dying, a non-
profit group formed after the defeat of the Washington Referendum in 1991, organized the 
litigation and was joined by other repeat litigators, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, 
before the Court. The opponents had the AMA and various religiously-related organizations, 
among others, as their constitutional allies. See KoMESAR, supra note 1, at 123-50. 
74 See Kim Murphy, Voters in Oregon Soundly Endorse Assisted Suicide, L.A. TIMEs, 
Nov. 5, 1997, at Al. Technically, the voters only agreed that the previously-passed measure 
should not be repealed. 
75 See Clairborne, supra note 68, at A4. 
76 See William Claiborne & Thomas B. Edsall, Affirmation of Oregon Suicide Law May 
Spur Movement, WASH. PosT, Nov. 6, 1997, at Al9. 
77 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275. 
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in patient deaths.78 Every interest group imaginable, from the Hemlock 
Society to religious groups, paid for advertisements to convince voters to 
adopt or defeat the proposed amendment to Washington's Natural Death 
Act.79 In the end, this media-embedded political process produced a 54 
percent majority opposed to the proposed legislation. 80 
Second, Oregon's process for enacting legislation is a form of "di-
rect democracy" limited to a few, mostly western states. Although the 
initiative process has the same end result-an enacted statute-as the 
legislative process, the latter is a different kind of institutional process. 
Some of the constraints on the legislative process-such as passage by 
two differently-constituted representative chambers and the risk of gu-
bernatorial veto in all states ("veto gates"81)-are not present in direct 
democracy schemes. 82 The role of interest groups further constrains the 
outcome of the legislative process because, on any given issue, many 
voters or non-voters are indifferent.83 Despite the media attention paid to 
the issue of physician-assisted death, it is not clear that most people 
would necessarily place resolution of this ethical debate at the top of 
their list of political priorities. As a result, when the issue is broached by 
legislators, the power of various interest groups to block the enactment of 
legislation authorizing physician-assisted death is probably greater than 
the polls indicate. Blocking legislation only requires the institutional ca-
pacity to capture one of the "veto gates," be it the failure to move a bill 
out of committee or a governor's veto. As long as the AMA represents. 
institutionalized medicine's political interests, its opposition to granting 
physicians the statutory right to assist patient deaths virtually assures that 
such a bill will not pass in two separate legislative chambers. 84 
78 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 810 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub 
nom. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct 2258 (1997). 
79 WASH. REv. CooE §§ 70.122.010-.900 (1991). The ballot read: "Shall adult patients 
who are in a medically terminal condition be permitted to request and receive from a physician 
aid-in-dying?" William McCord, Dignity, Choice and Care, SociETY, July/Aug. 1992, at 20. 
80 See Compassion in Dying, 19 F.3d at 810. 
81 See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory 
Interpretation, 51 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 3, 16-21 (1994). 
82 See JaneS. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent:" Interpretive Dilemmas in Di-
rect Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995). 
83 The recent Oregon vote on physician-assisted death was by mail-in ballot because of a 
provision of Oregon law allowing such balloting. See Voting by Mail, OR. REv. STAT. 
§ 254.470 (1996). The "cost" of voting to any particular voter was less in the 1997 ballot 
initiative than in the previous vote in 1994. For a useful analysis of the political process and 
interest groups, see KoMESAR, supra note 1, at 53-97. 
84 Some might argue that pain relief legislation could be passed because the AMA's 
Brief in Quill indicated its support for adequate pain relief. But the AMA's pain relief efforts 
might be directed at changing the profession rather than the existing regulatory and legislative 
structure regarding drugs. Or to put it more plainly, just because the AMA uses the inade-
quacy of pain relief in its brief before the Court does not necessarily translate into political 
support for a particular bill. 
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CONCLUSION 
A patient's plea of "let me die" was recently transformed into the 
idea that the law should protect the patient's ability to determine the tim-
ing of his or her death. Quill's rejection of this plea in its constitutional 
form means that proponents of physician-assisted death must return once 
again to the legislative corridors. As a result of the constitutional adjudi-
cation, the legislative debate will take place in a different institutional 
context where the political processes at both the state and federal levels 
will have to define their respective relationships to medicine. 
The following points are essential to consider in subsequent discus-
sions: 1) Quill's equal protection analysis provides the framework for 
legislative consideration of physician-assisted deaths because it high-
lights the role of the institution of medicine and its inherent limitations; 
2) Any post-Quill and Glucksberg legislative enactments are constrained 
by a "constitutional right to pain relief' for patients; and 3) Determining 
whether to grant physicians legislative exemptions to aid patients' deaths 
is a function of one's view of the appropriate institutional balance be-
tween law, medicine, family, and religion. 
The Court has determined that legislatures, as opposed to the federal 
courts, are the appropriate policy-making bodies to determine whether 
criminal sanctions, regulatory measures; deregulation of the use of some 
drugs, or the inherent controls within institutional medicine are the ap-
propriate means of responding to individual desires for control within 
this legal and medical matrix. Now it seems clear that we need to re-
focus our energies, as well as our vision, and concentrate on the real 
issue. Pain management and relief are issues of life, not death. For most 
of us, as family members and as prospective patients, how we live the 
last part of our lives is central and critical. 
The more we know about effective pain management by health care 
professionals, the better we will understand the risks, as well as the bene-
fits, of physician-assisted living in a terminal state. Effective pain man-
agement is important not only for those who have terminal illnesses, but 
also for those living with chronic conditions. Whether legislatures 
should authorize physician-assisted death for those whose pain cannot be 
"managed" is the question the Court leaves unanswered. 
My own view is that legislatures should encourage physician-as-
sisted living by modifying any laws or regulations which inhibit effective 
pain management for all patients. 85 
85 I take a somewhat pragmatic position on the need for change in existing regulations 
regarding pain medication. As long as physicians see existing regulations on opiates as "too 
burdensome," legislatures and regulators may have to change the laws simply to satisfy this 
political constituency. Other scholars are convinced that physician fears and the actions of 
disciplinary bodies require new statutes. See Johnson, supra note 50, at 320-22. 
